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October 18, 1985 
Re: 85-214 - Delaware v. Pensterer 
Dear Sandra: 
In his concurring opinion in California v. 
Green, the Chief Justice emphasized 1 the importance 
of allowing the states to experiment and innovate, 
especially in the area of criminal justice. • 399 
u.s. at 171. Because I believe that comment is 
applicable to the Delaware court's consideration of 
the question that is functionally equivalent to the 
question left open in Green (and discussed in 
footnote 18 on page 169), I adhere to my vote to deny 
cert. 
As you noted at pages S-6 of your circulating 
per curiam, in Green the Court left open the question 
of the admissibility of the stateaent •of a witness 
who disclaims all present knowledge of the ultimate 
event.• It seems to me that thi s case presents a 
very siailar question. The witness, PBI agent 
Robillard, disclaimed all present knowledge of the 
basis for his opinion that one of the victim's hairs 
bad been forcibly removed. And yet his qualification 
as an expert implied that he had a valid reason for 
reaching that conclusion at the time of his 
investigation. Robillard's present inability to 
recall that reason at trial deprived tbe defendant of 
an 9.1P@rtanlty to challenge the agent's testl .ony (at 
leait If one accepts tbe Delaware Supr ... Cour t' s 
ttadtag t bat •[w)itbout an acknovledt~ent of the 
bia o.pinion, defense coaneel ' • aroae-
IWIIM:tt.t• of the Agent was notlllnt aoce 
fu ill tr, • App. a to .a.M&.., 
..Uia.II.U M "•iL-.IIM· 
- 2 -
knowledge, the same w 
which to my mind . ay I would decide this case, 
representation oflnv?lves an implied prior 
present knowl d whlch the declarant disclaims 
without f 11 e ge, I would not resolve this case 
u argument • 
. . Interestingly, as you remark at page 2 of your 
0Pln~on, the defense called upon or. DeForest to 
t7st1fy that sometime before trial Robillard had told 
h1m that he (Robillard) had relied on the follicular 
tag theory to conclude that the hair was forcibly 
:emoved. If Dr. DeForest's testimony had been 
1ntroduced by the prosecution instead of the defense, 
we would have a situation perfectly parallel to that 
presented in Green because the officer in Green, ljKe 
Dr. DeForest in this case, testified to the 
declarant's prior, out-of-court statement which the 
declarant now disavows at trial. Because of this 
analogy, I would hesitate to rely on Dr. DeForest's 
testimony to bar the Delaware Supreme Court from 
invalidating the conviction on some other 
constitutional ground, as you seem to imply in your 
penultimate paragraph. This comment is not needed to 
support the disposition you seek and is hazardous 
considering that the record is not before us. 
If the Court does conclude that the issue should 
be resolved in this case, I would vote to grant cert 
rather than to have the case decided summarily. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 
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